Haiti Electoral Decree: Rising Tensions Between the Prime Minister’s Office and the CEP

Port-au-Prince, June 2, 2026 — Tensions between the Prime Minister’s Office and Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) over the forthcoming electoral decree have now surfaced openly through two statements released on Tuesday presenting sharply divergent accounts of the meeting held between the two institutions.

While the Prime Minister’s Office described the meeting as being marked by a “convergence of views” and a shared commitment to organizing “credible, transparent, and inclusive” elections, the CEP, for its part, denounced what it considers a direct attack on its constitutional independence.

In an unusually firm statement, the CEP asserted that the document presented by the government was “completely different” from the draft electoral decree submitted to the Executive on April 24, 2026.

The Electoral Council further argued that the government’s approach “confirms the unconstitutional nature of the Prime Minister’s Office’s decision, which violates the principle of independence of any Electoral Council.”

The CEP also reiterated that “the initiative for drafting the electoral decree falls under the exclusive competence of the CEP.”

Two Opposing Interpretations of the Same Meeting

The contradiction between the two statements has particularly drawn the attention of observers.

According to several sources contacted by our newsroom, the debate surrounding the electoral decree had never truly been settled between the two institutions.

Certain voices favorable to the CEP argue that, in the absence of a functioning Parliament, the Prime Minister’s Office should accept the electoral decree as submitted by the Electoral Council, considering the CEP to be the technically competent authority in electoral matters.

Others, closer to the Executive branch, maintain instead that the government retains oversight authority over a text that will ultimately be promulgated as a governmental decree binding the State.

The Provisions at the Heart of the Dispute

Beyond the diplomatic language, several provisions proposed or amended by the Prime Minister’s Office reportedly lie at the core of the tensions.

According to our information, the issue of the CEP’s General Directorate constitutes one of the principal points of friction. A source close to the Prime Minister’s Office recalled that the CEP’s General Regulation of January 18, 2008 refers to a “General Directorate” rather than an “Executive Directorate,” an institutional nuance currently generating debate.

Another sensitive issue concerns electoral litigation. Officials within the Prime Minister’s Office reportedly believe that the CEP “cannot simultaneously serve as both judge and party” in electoral disputes, thereby opening the door to proposals involving external oversight mechanisms or revisions to the Council’s powers.

Financial oversight also appears among the contentious issues. According to our sources, the Prime Minister’s Office requested a detailed report on CEP expenditures. Discussions are also reportedly underway regarding the operation of departmental tabulation centers.

The composition of polling station staff has likewise become a matter of debate. Documents recently reviewed by our newsroom reveal a significant modification concerning Polling Station Members (MBV). Contrary to previous practices that sometimes involved representatives from civil society organizations, the text currently under discussion would now provide for the recruitment of MBV members from among Secondary 4 (S4) students, vocational training students, and university students aged at least 18.

However, our newsroom has also learned that the Prime Minister’s Office ultimately maintained the proposal requiring political parties to submit a list of at least thirty thousand members.

Eight Key Questions Arise

• Who is truly seeking to control the upcoming elections: the CEP or the Prime Minister’s Office?
• Behind the defense of “electoral independence,” which political actors are currently influencing the CEP?
• Why did the Prime Minister’s Office seek to modify an electoral decree already submitted by the CEP?
• Does the conflict surrounding the electoral decree conceal a broader struggle for control over Haiti’s political transition?
• Why does the CEP reject the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister’s Office?
• Are the proposed changes regarding electoral litigation, the CEP’s General Directorate, and tabulation centers intended to strengthen transparency or redistribute electoral power?
• What political and institutional interests are truly at stake behind this standoff between the Executive and the CEP?
• Does the absence of Parliament grant the CEP full autonomy in drafting the electoral decree?

Despite these major disagreements, both the Prime Minister’s Office and the CEP maintain that they intend to continue technical discussions concerning the electoral timetable and the security conditions required to hold upcoming elections in a national context still marked by instability.

The Editorial Staff